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GRAY V. ROMEO*: RIGHT OF PRIVACY OVEREXTENDED TO ALLOW WITHDRAWAL OF
NUTRITION FROM PATIENT IN PERSISTENT
VEGETATIVE STATE
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as providing a right to privacy1 which encompasses a right to
self-determination2 in controlling the administration of medical
treatment.3 In Gray v. Romeo, the United States District Court for
Rhode Island determined whether the right to privacy allows a person in a persistent vegetative state," who is incapable of intelligent
* 697 F. Supp. 580 (D. R.I. 1988)
1. The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court, in protecting a married
couple's use of contraceptives, announced for the first time that the right to privacy
was guaranteed by the Constitution. In finding that the privacy right protected a
married couple's decision to use contraceptives, the Court held that the right of privacy is found in the penumbra formed by emanations of specific constitutional guarantees. Id. at 484. In other words, the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments are
based on protecting interests that may generally be viewed under the heading of privacy. This constitutional concern, combined with the ninth amendment's provision
that the rights enumerated in the Constitution shall not disparage other rights not so
enumerated, form a general zone of privacy that exists outside of the specified Constitutional guarantees. Id. at 484-85.
Courts have also found the roots of the privacy right in various amendments.
See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (first amendment necessarily
protects right to receive information and ideas, and to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967)
(fourth amendment protects, and fifth amendment reflects a concern for, protection
of individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (first section of fourteenth amendment guarantees
the concept of liberty).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). In analyzing previous decisions
concerning the right of privacy, the Court found that the only rights included in the
guarantee of personal privacy are those that are fundamental or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 152, citing, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937).
The Roe Court found that the right of personal privacy includes the decision of a
woman to have an abortion. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. However, this right is not absolute
and must be balanced against state interests. Id. The Court found that the state interests become sufficiently compelling to override a woman's right of privacy at the
end of the first trimester of pregnancy. Id. at 163. Therefore, under Roe, until the end
of the third month of pregnancy, a woman has the right to terminate the pregnancy.
Id. at 164. However, after the third month, the state can regulate the abortion procedure. Id.
3. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
The right to privacy is presumably broad enough to allow a patient to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
4. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 582. A persistent vegetative state (PVS) is:
[A] type of comatose state in which the cerebral functioning has ceased but in
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sensation, to refuse life-sustaining nourishment which will result in

death. This was the first time that a federal district court con7
fronted this issue." The court allowed cessation of artificial feeding,
and required the hospital to accede to the wishes of the patient's
guardian." By this ruling, the court held that the right of self-determinatiQn, as protected by the fourteenth amendment, outweighs any
state interests in preserving life.' However, to arrive at this decision,
the court extended the privacy right beyond the limitations which
the Supreme Court has enunciated.
On Saturday, January 4, 1986, the Rhode Island Hospital admitted Marcia Gray 0 after she suffered a major cerebral hemorrhage.1" Mrs. Gray's husband, Glenn, and her two children, Brian
which the brain stem functioning is fully or partially intact. The brain stem
controls primitive reflexes, including heart activity, breathing, the sleep/wake
cycle, reflexive activity in upper and lower extremities, some swallowing motions and eye movements. Marcia shows signs of each of these activities. The
cerebrum, on the other hand, controls sensation and voluntary conscious activities. [Because] Marcia's cerebrum has been damaged severely ... she displays
no voluntary or conscious movements, nor does she display any awareness or
sensation. This combination of reflexive activity in the absence of sensation or
conscious activity is characteristic of PVS. PVS is generally a permanent
condition.
Id.
5. Marcia Gray was only capable of reflexive activity because that part of her
brain which controlled intelligent sensation was severely damaged. Id.
6. Several state courts have previously addressed issues similar to the one in
Gray. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 212, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (right
of nursing home patient in chronic vegetative state to have nasogastric tube removed
and not resuscitate order placed on medical chart); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (nonterminal, competent patient has right to
compel hospital to remove nasogastric tube); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App.
3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (doctors who removed all life-support systems and
ceased providing hydration and nourishment from vegetative state acquitted of murder charges); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713
(1984) (right of family to call for removal of respirator from semicomatose patient);
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980) (court ordering
discontinuance of respirator and feeding tube); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (removal of gastronomy tube); In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (termination of life-prolonging hemodialysis treatment); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977) (substituted judgment standard used to refuse chemotherapy
treatments); In re Heir, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984) (court's refusal
to require surgery to insert feeding tube); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985) (feeding tube could not be removed from elderly, incompetent patient because
guardian ad litem objected); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (removal
of respirator), cert. denied, Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 992 (1976); Westchester
County Med. Ctr. v. Hall, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607 (1988) (authorized hospital
to surgically insert feeding tube).
7. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 589-90.
8. Id. at 591.
9. Id. at 589-90.
10. Id. at 582.
11. A cerebral hemorrhage is a profuse flow of blood into the substance of the
cerebrum, which is the principle portion of the brain including practically all parts

within the skull.

STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY

637 (24th ed. 1982).
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and Karen, consented to a brain operation in an effort to save her
life.' 2 Marcia Gray underwent a right frontal craniotomy 3 which established that she had suffered a massive hemorrhage and severe
brain damage to the right cerebral hemisphere.' 4 She never regained
consciousness. 5
To facilitate feeding Mrs. Gray, Glenn Gray consented to the
surgical insertion of a G-tube'6 on January 16, 1986. Between January 16, 1986 and June 10, 1986, Mrs. Gray underwent further surgery and four separate medical procedures,' 7 and doctors performed
subsequent procedures to counter infection."8 On June 24, 1986,
Marcia Gray was transferred to the Rhode Island Medical Center. 9
Her doctors diagnosed Mrs. Gray as being in a "persistent vegetative
state" (PVS).2 As such, she was maintained on "comfort only
status."'"
On May 20, 1987, Mrs. Gray's husband, her two children, her
mother and her sister-in-law requested that the attending physician
stop feeding Mrs. Gray.22 The hospital denied this request because it
equated the removal of nutrition and hydration with euthanasia,
which it considered inconsistent with a health care provider's role.22
Moreover, the hospital feared civil or criminal liability, and it
12. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 582. Mrs. Gray was originally brought to the South
County Hospital because she was experiencing a severe headache with serious pain.
Id. After a CAT scan showed initial evidence of a blood vessel rupture, she was transferred to the Rhode Island Hospital where a neurologist, Paul Welch, confirmed a
major cerebral hemorrhage. Id.
13. Id. The right frontal craniotomy involved the removal of a section of Mrs.
Gray's skullbone to extract a blood clot which was present in the brain. Id.
14. Id. The massive hemorrhage occurred within the cerebrum and the meninges, which is the membrane that covers the brain. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. To provide nutrition and hydration directly to the stomach, a gastrostomy was performed. Id. This procedure involves the creation of a hole in the abdominal wall and into the stomach. Id. Nutrition and hydration are provided to the patient through a tube, known as a G-tube, which is directly inserted into the stomach.
Id. To aid in the removal of mucus in Mrs. Gray's throat, an endotracheal tube was
inserted in her trachea. Id.
17. Id. Surgery was performed on February 6, 1986 because Mrs. Gray had developed hydrocephalus, a build up of cerebrospinal fluid in the brain. Id. The procedure involved the insertion of a shunt to drain the excess fluid. Id. Due to malfunctions of the shunt, four additional procedures were required. Id.
18. Id. The removal of the cranial bone plate and the deterioration of brain
matter on the right side of the brain left a sunken crater on the right side of her head.
Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 582-83. Mrs. Gray received no medical attention except for nutrition
and hydration. Id. Her care included feedings of a liquid formula every four hours
through the G-tube, and water provided through the tube in-between the feedings.
Id. The opinion states that she was in need of constant attention, but does not describe the nature of the care required. Id.
22. Id. at 583.
23. Id.
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wanted to protect its reputation as an institution for long-term
care.2 The professional health care personnel who were taking care
of Mrs. Gray also unanimously opposed removing nutrition and
hydration.2 6
Even though the health care provider preferred to maintain
Mrs. Gray's current status, the neurosurgeon, the consulting physician and the treating physician all agreed that it was unlikely that
she would return to a conscious state.2" The neurosurgeon and consulting physician believed that Mrs. Gray's conscious faculties had
ceased to function; therefore, she would not experience pain, thirst
or hunger if the hospital stopped feeding Mrs. Gray.27
The state probate court appointed Mrs. Gray's husband, Glenn,
as guardian of her person and estate.2" The federal district court appointed a guardian ad litem2" to determine what Mrs. Gray's wishes
would have been if she was competent. This guardian ad litem also
was to determine whether the family had any ulterior motives in
requesting the termination of feeding and what course of action was
30
in her best interest.
The guardian ad litem reported that Mrs. Gray had several conversations with her husband and her sister-in-law concerning the
24. Id.
25. Id. The difficulty of determining the extent of brain damage is highlighted
in a published statement written for the Pope John XXIII Center, and endorsed by
over 100 physicians, ethicists and scholars. May, Barry, Griese, Grisez, Johnstone,
Marzen, McHugh, Meilander, Siegler and Smith, Feeding and Hydrating the Permanently Unconscious and Other Vulnerable Persons, 3 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 203 (1987).
Because each medical condition is unique, there are always more and less severe cases
which may produce the same symptoms. Id. at 207.
26. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 583. The family consulted with an outside physician
who was board certified in neurology and internal medicine to evaluate Mrs. Gray's
condition. Id. Both the consulting physician and the neurologist who performed the
craniotomy agreed that there was no chance of recovery, and that it was unlikely that
Marcia Gray would return to a conscious state. Id. The treating physician at the General Hospital also stated that her chances of recovery were "close to zero." Id.
27. Id. The neurosurgeon indicated that Marcia Gray did not exhibit any "conscious, cognitive, sentient responses which would indicate functioning cerebral hemisphere activity." Id. Although she had responded to noxious stimuli, he felt that
these responses were of "questionable significance given the primitive nature of the
startle reflex." Id. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text (explanation of
which of Mrs. Gray's faculties had ceased to function).
28. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 583.
29. A guardian ad litem is a guardian appointed by the court to represent the
interests of an infant or incompetent in the pending litigation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (5th ed. 1979).
30. Telephone interview with Linda S. MacDonald, attorney for the plaintiff,
East Greenwich, Rhode Island (March 16, 1989). Ms. MacDonald pointed out that
there were no ulterior motives found in this case. Id. Furthermore, Mr. Gray had
authorized the G-tube and other procedures in the hope that Mrs. Gray still had
some chance of recovery. Id. He was not informed until December, 1987 that it was
highly unlikely that she would return to a conscious state. Id. It was at this time that
the family began to evaluate what Marcia Gray's wishes would have been. Id.
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plight of Karen Ann Quinlan.' Karen Ann Quinlan was a 22 yearold woman diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state whose
3
life was supported by an artificial respirator and a feeding tube".
During these conversations, Mrs. Gray expressed her feelings that if
she were in the same circumstances, she would not want a respirator
or feeding tube.13 Glenn Gray also stated that at one point he had
promised his wife that if she ever were in a situation similar to
Karen Ann Quinlan, he would not keep her alive by artificial
means.3 4 Based on this evidence, the guardian ad litem agreed that,
if competent, Mrs. Gray would refuse the life-sustaining medical
treatment. 5
Glenn Gray, as guardian of Marcia's person and estate, brought
this action on her behalf to obtain a declaration that the actions of
the hospital violated Marcia Gray's constitutional rights, and to obtain authorization for the guardian to require the hospital to withdraw the life support apparatus. 36 The court held in favor of Glenn
Gray and ordered the removal of the nutrition and hydration.3 7 Pursuant to the court's decision, the doctors withdrew nutrition and hydration on November 15, 1988, and Marcia Gray died 15 days
later. 3

During those 15 days, Mrs. Gray lost approximately 50

39
pounds and received the drug Valium to reduce seizures.

31. See Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 583. At the age of 22, Karen Quinlan was diagnosed as being in a chronic persistent vegetative state. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 24,
355 A.2d 647, 654, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Karen's breathing was assisted
by a respirator, and she was fed through a nasal-gastro tube. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at
655. Karen's father sought appointment as her guardian for the purposes of withdrawing only extraordinary means of treatment, i.e. the respirator. Id. at 22, 355 A.2d
at 658. Mr. Quinlan did not request removal of the feeding tube. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at
671-72. The court appointed Mr. Quinlan as guardian with instructions to the family
and the attending physicians to evaluate Karen's condition. Id. The respirator could
be discontinued only if the guardian, family, attending physicians and the hospital
Ethics Committee concurred that there was no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever
emerging from the comatose condition. Id. The respirator was removed and Karen
Quinlan lived for nine years. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 413 n.6 (Mo. 1988)
(en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
32. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 18-24, 355 A.2d at 651-55.
33. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 583.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 587.
36. Id. at 583. Glenn Gray, on behalf of Marcia Gray, brought this action into
federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides federal jurisdiction whenever a
person, acting under color of any statute or regulation of any state, deprives another
of rights secured by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Therefore, the United
States District Court had jurisdiction over this case because a state hospital was depriving Mrs. Gray of the right of privacy by refusing to terminate the life support
procedures.
37. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 591.
38. Eisenstadt, An Ordeal Ends: Marcia Gray Dies, Providence Journal, Dec. 1,
1988, at Al.
39. Id. The final cause of death was kidney and respiratory failure. Id. According to that article, Rhode Island's Governor got involved in the legal dispute by ordering state officials not to appeal the district court's ruling. Id.
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The United States District Court for Rhode Island found that
the central issue was whether the state can insist that a person in a
persistent vegetative state submit to medical care if the treatment
would be contrary to the patient's preferences.40 To resolve this
question, the court considered whether Mrs. Gray had a federal constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 4 I This required
the court to resolve two sub-issues. The first sub-issue was whether
this type of decision is protected by the right of privacy. The second
sub-issue was that, even if the decision does fall within the right to
privacy, does the state's interest in preventing the starvation of a
person override the individual's right to choose.
The court construed the right to privacy as one that encompasses the right to control medical decisions because this right of
self-determination is "deeply rooted in our country's history and
tradition."' 2 Furthermore, Marcia Gray's right to refuse medical
treatment included the right to have the G-tube removed. 4 3 Next,
the court determined that, although Marcia Gray was incompetent,
the evidence clearly supported removal of the G-tube."" Furthermore, the court ruled that there were no governmental interests that
outweighed Marcia Gray's interest in self-determination. 5 There40. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 584. By phrasing the issues this way, the court was
able to view the problem not as relating to death, but rather to life and its circumstances. Id.
41. The court also considered four related issues: Whether nutrition and hydration are the type of medical treatment that a person may refuse, whether there are
any overriding state interests; what is the role of a health care provider in a situation
like this; and what are the rights of an incompetent patient in such a situation. Id. at
584-90.
Competent persons have a right to refuse medical treatment, even if that decision results in the patient's death. See State Dep't of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563
S.W.2d 197, 209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 U.S. 923
(1978). Legal competency, for the purposes of making this type of decision, has been
defined as the "mental ability to make a rational decision, which includes the ability
to perceive, appreciate all relevant facts and to reach a rational judgment upon such
facts." Id:
It is clear that the right to refuse medical treatment must extend to incompetents. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745,
370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977). The difficulty, however, lies in determining what the patient's decision would be. Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice:
Examining the "Right to Die", 77 Ky. L.J. 319, 344-45 (1988-89).

42. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 584.
43. Id. at 587.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 588. Courts often find that the state's interests do not outweigh the
individual's interest in the freedom to refuse medical treatment. See Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(1977). In upholding the right of a sixty-seven year old terminally ill patient to refuse
chemotherapy treatments, the Saikewicz court concluded that the constitutional
right to privacy is one of the fundamental constituents of life and is not outweighed
by any state interests in the preservation of life. Id. 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at
426. Furthermore, medical ethics are not offended because the medical community
recognizes that terminally ill patients are often more in need of comfort than treat-
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fore, the court held that the Rhode Island Medical Center must accede to Marcia Gray's right to terminate nutrition and hydration."
In finding that the right to privacy is based on the principle of
self-determination,' 7 the court began its analysis by examining cases
that recognize a federal right to control medical decisions."s The
court interpreted the decision in Roe v. Wade"9 to stand for the
principle that the right of a woman to control fundamental decisions
involving her own body is grounded in the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause.50 Although the right of privacy is not absolute
and must be balanced against important state interests, the court
found that the basis of this right is in the principle of personal autonomy. 1 Similarly, the court interpreted decisions involving the
use of contraceptives,52 mandatory sterilization of habitual
criminals,5 3 abortion legislation,"' and state legislation enacted to
ment. Id. 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
A competent patient's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment will generally outweigh any state interests, and a patient does not lose this right upon becoming incompetent. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (court permitted
surrogate decision maker to determine whether to refuse life-sustaining treatment to
a non-elderly patient in persistent vegetative state who had never expressed an opinion regarding this type of treatment.)
46. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 591.
47. Id. at 585.
48. Id.
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In invalidating state abortion prohibitions, the Court
found that the right of privacy is founded in the fourteenth amendment's concept of
personal liberty. Id. at 153. Furthermore, although the exercising of this right is subject to important state interests, it is broad enough to encompass a woman's freedom
to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. Id.
In an attempt to determine whether the right to privacy encompasses the abortion decision, the Court began its analysis by examining the medical-legal history of
abortion regulation. Id; at 117. Interestingly, abortion laws are not of ancient or even
common-law origin. Id. at 129. In fact, at common law, at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution, and throughout most of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with
less disfavor than under most American statutes. Id. at 140. In contrast, those who
argue that removing food and nutrition from a terminally ill or vegetative patient
amounts to suicide point out that under English common law, suicide was considered
the legal equivalent of self-murder which subjected the actor to severe punishment.
See Horan & Grant, Suicide: The Next Pro-Life Frontier,STUDIES IN LAW, MEDICINE
& SOCITY 1-2 (1987). A recent Supreme Court decision, however, may have called
into question the value of Roe v. Wade. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
50. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 585.
51. Id.
52. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating statutes
prohibiting the use of contraceptives).
53. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Gray
court found that this case implicated the right to privacy by protecting the right to

control medical decisions affecting one's body. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 585. However, in
holding that the Oklahoma sterilization statute violates the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the Skinner Court emphasized that the Oklahoma Act
involves one of the basic and fundamental rights of man - marriage and procreation.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. This concept later became the basis for finding the right to
privacy which the Court used to invalidate Connecticut's statute prohibiting the use
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as reaffirming the general principles set forth

The Gray court next distinguished the recent case of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 7 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Georgia statute criminalizing consensual sodomy.5" The court in
Gray found that the Supreme Court limited the interpretation of
privacy rights to include only those personal decigions that are
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."59 The Gray
court reasoned that since the right to control medical decisions is
fundamental,"0 the right of privacy must include Mrs. Gray's right
to refuse food and water."1 The court further found that the right to
control medical decisions was more analogous to decisions concerning abortions and contraceptives 2 than to the claimed constitutional
of contraceptives in Griswold. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. The marriage relationship is a
time-honored and noble institution, and is the type of association that demands protection. Id. at 486. In fact, in a concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade, Justice Stewart
emphasized that an individual's freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment. Roe,
410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
54. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983). In evaluating the constitutionality of provisions regulating abortions, the
Court specifically reaffirmed the Roe decision. Id. at 420. Because the burdens resulting from the Akron regulations were not supported by compelling state interests, the
regulations were unconstitutional. Id. at 433-36. Instead of reaffirming the principle
of personal autonomy, as the Gray court later urged, the Akron decision more firmly
established the need to balance the state interests against an individual's right to
privacy. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 434. Where a compelling state interest is shown, and
the regulation is designed to further that interest without departing from accepted
medical practice, the regulation will be upheld. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 434.
55. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986). This decision invalidated Pennsylvania abortion regulations by relying on the general principles set forth in Roe and Akron. See id. at 759. However, the
Court did not solely rely on the concept of personal autonomy. Id. at 772. Rather, the
Court held "few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or
more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision - with the
guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in Roe - whether to end
her pregnancy." Id. at 772. Therefore, it seems that the Gray court may have misinterpreted the Thornburgh reasoning when it viewed the right to privacy broadly. See
Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 586.
56. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 584-85.
57. 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986). In cautioning against an
expansive interpretation of privacy rights, the Court narrowly construed the holdings
of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe by holding that the right to privacy is limited to
such activities as family, marriage, or procreation. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
58. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 586, citing, Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977).
59. Id.
60. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). In Botsford, the
Court held that it could not order a plaintiff to submit to a surgical examination
because "[n]o right is held more sacred . . . than the right of every individual to ...

[be] free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. at 251.
61. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 586.
62. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (cases upholding the right to
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right to engage in consensual homosexual acts.13 Therefore, the
court found that the right to privacy protected Mrs. Gray's right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. 4
The Gray court next found that other courts have found no analytical difference between artificial feeding and other life-support
measures.6 6 In support of this position, the court cited cases which
allowed the removal of nutrition and hydration. 6 Therefore, the
court found that Marcia Gray's right to refuse treatment included
the right to have the G-tube removed.6
The Gray court further held that the right to refuse medical
treatment extended equally to both competent and incompetent patients.6 8 In addition to citing precedent supporting an incompetent's
right to refuse medical treatment," the court examined the use of
the substituted judgment analysis that would allow the patient to
exercise this right. 70 The court went on to hold that the evidence in
this case clearly supported a finding that Marcia Gray, if competent,
71
would refuse life sustaining medical treatment.
The court next examined the competing governmental and state
interests. In Roe, the United States Supreme Court held that, because no privacy right is absolute, courts must balance the right of
the individual against the competing state interests. 72 The governmental interests at stake included: "the preservation of life, the precontrol medical decisions).
63. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 585-86.
64. Id. at 586.
65. Id.
66. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d
626 (1986) (guardian allowed to remove G-tube); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d
434 (1987) (removal of nutrition from patient in irreversible vegetative state).
67. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 587.
68. Id.
69. Id., citing, Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497
N.E.2d 626 (1986). The Brophy court held that the value of human dignity extends to
both competents and incompetents. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 431, 497 N.E.2d at 634. See
also Thomson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (plurality holding that rights of
incompetents are only meaningful as exercised by agents acting with the principals'
best interests in mind); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 366, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (fact
that incompetents cannot not sense the violation of their rights does not permit the
obliteration of those rights).
70. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 587, citing, In re Doe, 533 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1987)). In
determining the procedure by which an incompetent person could exercise her right
to have an abortion, the Doe court adopted the substitute judgment doctrine. Doe,
533 A.2d at 525-26. This doctrine allowed the court, with the assistance of the guardian ad litem to determine what the incompetent's decision would have been if she
were competent. The court upheld the determination that her decision would have
been to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 526-27.
71. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 587-88. The evidence the court relied on consisted of
Marcia Gray's conversations with her husband and sister-in-law and the guardian ad
litem's agreement with the family decision. Id.
72. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
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vention of suicide, the protection of innocent third parties, and the
integrity of medical ethics. '7 3 The Gray court conceded that the
preservation of life is the greatest governmental interest.7 4 However,
the court reasoned that governmental interests do not override an
individual's interest when the individual is in a situation which he
would feel degrades his humanity.7 5 Therefore, because artificial
feeding is the type of intrusive treatment that can demean or degrade an individual's humanity, the 6 individual's interest is para7
mount to any governmental interest.
In addition, the Gray court found there were no interests which
overrode Mrs. Gray's right to privacy. The court found that the interest of the state in preventing suicide was not implicated in this
case.7 7 It also determined that innocent third parties, consisting of
the patient's dependents, 78 were sufficiently protected because all of
Marcia Gray's dependents have sought and endorsed Marcia's right
to terminate treatment.79 The court further decided that maintaining the integrity of medical ethics was not such a substantial interest so as to justify overriding Mrs. Gray's wishes.80 Furthermore, because both case law"' and Rhode Island law82 recognize that a
73. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 588.
74. Id.
75. Id., citing, Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497
N.E.2d 626 (1986). Paul Brophy existed in a persistent vegetative state after suffering
a rupture of an aneurysm. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 421, 497 N.E.2d at 628. Brophy was
dependent upon a G-tube for nourishment. Id. at 425, 497 N.E.2d at 630. The court
noted that nothing medical regulates the process of digesting food. Id. at 426, 497
N.E.2d at 631. The G-tube merely allows the food to get to the stomach without
requiring the patient to swallow. Id. In allowing the G-tube to be removed, the court
espoused the self-determination theory of privacy. Id. at 430, 497 N.E.2d at 633. Furthermore, the state's interest in preserving life did not override Brophy's right to
refuse treatment because his affliction was not curable and the treatment was intrusive. Id. at 435-39, 497 N.E.2d at 636-38.
76. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 588-89, citing, Brophy, 398 Mass. at 434, 497 N.E.2d
at 635 (as a matter of law, maintenance of patient on G-tube is intrusive treatment).
77. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 589. Another court examining a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment drew a distinction between deliberately ending
a life by artificial means and allowing nature to take its, course. See id. (interpreting
Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D. D.C. 1985) (competent adult patient at federal medical facility had right to have life-support apparatus
removed, and removal of patient's life support system does not constitute suicide)).
78. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 n.8 (D.
D.C. 1985), citing, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (consideration of the rights of innocent third parties is generally limited to considering adverse affects on the patient's dependents).
79. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 589.
80. Id.
81. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972)(medical ethics incorporate the principle that the patient will determine the
course of care).
82. Rhode Island's law reads: "The patient shall have the right to refuse any
treatment by the health care facility to the extent permitted by law." R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-17-19.1(4)(1985).
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patient determines what medical treatment to accept and what
treatment to refuse,83 there were no state interests that could override Mrs. Gray's right to refuse medical treatment."" Consequently,
because the court found that Rhode Island legislation 5 and case
law" guarantee a patient the right to refuse medical treatment, 7 the
Rhode Island Medical Center was obligated to either promptly
transfer Mrs. Gray to another institution or comply with her
wishes.88
Every medical situation is unique; therefore, courts must tread
carefully when making life and death decisions for incompetent patients.8 " The cessation of feeding does not merely allow a patient to
die from the underlying disease, but rather, directly causes the
death of the patient.90 Due to the severity of Mrs. Gray's condition,
83. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 589.
84. Id. at 590.
85. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-19.1(4)(1985).
86. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 590, citing, In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434
(1987). The Jobes court held that the nursing home could not refuse to withdraw
artificial feeding because the family could not have known that the choice of nursing
home was also a choice between medical alternatives. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 425, 529 A.2d
at 450. The family was entitled to rely on the nursing home's willingness to defer to
their choice of medical treatment. Id.
87. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 590.
88. Id. at 591.
89. In order to preserve a consensus regarding legal standards, court opinions
dealing with these very difficult cases must take into account the authority of physicians to make medical judgments, and the duty of society to insure that patients'
rights are protected by sound and ethical medical practice. Horan & Grant, The Legal Aspects of Withdrawing Nourishment, 5 J. L. & MED. 595, 599 (1984). After all, it
seems that the rights of those who want to live should be as fiercely protected as the
rights of those who want to die.
Because the patient in Cruzan is not terminally ill, the debate is not between life
and death, but rather between quality of life and death. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
N.W.2d 408, 413 n.6 (Mo. 1988)(en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
90. Historically, courts have viewed the right to refuse treatment in terms of
whether the treatment was extraordinary or ordinary. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (extraordinary life support
measures may be withdrawn from an incompetent, terminally ill patient). A respirator may be considered ordinary care when used for a curable patient, and extraordinary care in the case of an irreversibly comatose patient. See generally In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 48, 355 A.2d 647, 667-68 (1976);and Comment, The Physician's Duty to
Ascertain and Comply with a Competent Patient's Preferences Regarding Resuscitation, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 312-14 (1984) (physician's duty of care to terminally ill
patients). Because of advancements in medical technology, this distinction is no
longer useful. See gene'rally Haymann, Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment
for Incompetent Nursing Home Patients,6 MED.& L. 107 (1987) (physician's right to
refuse life-sustaining support); Comment, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's
Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CAL. L. REV. 707 (1987) [hereinafter Suicidal Competence] (balancing state's right to prevent suicide against patient's right
to refuse treatment); Note, The Tragic Choice: Termination of Care for Patients in a
Permanent Vegetative State, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 285 (1976).
The administration of food and water is more than merely symbolic because the
death process from starvation bears no relation to death from the underlying disease.
The difficulties in addressing this issue were raised in the dissenting opinions in
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and the dim prognosis for recovery, the decision in this case was
arguably correct.9 1 However, the Gray court's analysis was flawed.
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
Three dissenting justices argued that food and water were not medical care:
The court has built its entire case on an outrageously erroneous premise, i.e.,
food and liquids are medical treatment. The issue is not whether the tube
should be inserted but whether food should be given through the tube. The
process of feeding is simply not medical treatment and is not invasive ....
Food and water are basic human needs.
Id. at 442, 497 N.E.2d at 640 (Nolan, J., dissenting). The issue is not whether courts
should endorse the refusal of food and water, but rather how this decision is to be
made. The result must include a realization of the actual consequences as it affects
the medical profession, society and the patient.
91. Other courts have required a stricter review of the patient's wishes. See generally In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (statements made while competent were deemed unreliable because they were remote, general, spontaneous and
made in casual circumstances); Westchester County Med. Ctr. v. Hall, 72 N.Y.2d 517,
531 N.E.2d 607 (1988) (statements made by competent patient that she would refuse
life-sustaining treatment found to be too remote to allow cessation of treatment). Informed consent assumes the patient is aware of the risks of treatment, risks of nontreatment and available alternatives. Hirsch & Cuneo, Who Shall Live, Who Shall
Die. Who Decides?, 5 MED. & L. 111, 113 (1986). A statement made by a competent,
healthy person as to how they would feel if confronted by a life-threatening disease
should not be considered to be an informed decision. See Beschle, infra note 41, at
344-45. See also Smith, In re Quinlan. Defining the Basis for Terminating Life Support Under the Right of Privacy, 12 TULSA L.J. 150, 161 (1976) (permitting a guardian to make personal medical decisions for an incompetent patient actually interferes
with the patient's right of privacy).
The Gray court should have applied an objective, quantifiable test to determine
what treatment was in the best interest of Mrs. Gray. For example, the Conroy court
propounded three tests to guide courts in making these types of medical decisions.
See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). Specifically, Claire Conroy's
guardian sought permission to remove her nasogastric feeding tube. Id. at 335, 486
A.2d at 1213. The first test, known as the subjective test, allows a guardian to exercise
a substituted judgment to refuse medical treatment where there is clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent patient would refuse treatment under the circumstances. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1231. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence,
the limited objective test should be applied. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1231. This test
allows life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn where there is trustworthy evidence
that the patient would have refused the treatment, and the burdens of maintaining
life outweigh the benefits to the patient. Id. In the absence of any evidence of the
patient's desires, the pure objective test allows life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn when the effect of administering such treatment is inhumane due to severe,
recurring and unavoidable pain. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232. Although Ms. Conroy
died during the pendency of the litigation, the court found that the evidence at trial
was inadequate to satisfy any of the three tests, and would have refused to allow
cessation of the feeding. Id. at 386, 486 A.2d at 1232.
The Conroy court further set forth a list of objective factors to be considered:
patient's present level of cognitive functioning; degree of physical pain resulting from
the medical condition, treatment, and termination of treatment; degree of dependence and loss of dignity as a result of the condition and treatment; prognosis with
and without treatment; various treatment options; and risks and benefits of each of
those options. Id. at 1285 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (best interests standard requires consideration of objective criteria such as relief from suffering, preservation of function and extent of life); Classen, Substituted Judgment: The Courts
Speak for the Speechless, 5 MED. & L. 199 (1986) (arguing that a uniform method of
decisionmaking is critical to protect incompetent individuals); Comment, The Right

19891

Gray v. Romeo

By misconstruing the Supreme Court's recent privacy decisions, and
in light of the most recent Supreme Court privacy decision, the
Gray court's ruling extended this right beyond the boundaries the
Supreme Court had previously enunciated, and did so without providing guidance for future courts faced with analogous factual
situations.
While courts have found the right to privacy to be grounded in
the Constitution,9 2 this right is elusive and has escaped any firm definition.3 In an effort to explain the basis for this right, courts have
advanced two divergent theories. One theory is that the right to prito Die - A Current Look, 30 Loy. L. REV. 139 (1984) (suggesting living wills or trusts
as an alternative to the substituted judgment standard).
In Westchester County Medical Center v. Hall, the New York Court of Appeals
held that the appropriate standard requires that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that the patient intended to decline the treatment under the particular
circumstances. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 529, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (1988). The court found this
standard, which is the most rigorous burden of proof in civil cases, necessary to prevent a lethal error. Id.
Courts have also adopted a substituted judgment doctrine which requires a surrogate decisionmaker to consider the patient's personal value system in determining
what is in the best interest of the patient. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (purpose of substituted judgment is to determine the wants and needs of the patient); In re Jobes, 108
N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987)(surrogate decision-maker must obtain confirmation of
diagnosis from guardian, family, attending physician and hospital prognosis committee); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (family members proper parties to
make substituted judgment).
The Gray court should have balanced the following factors: the severity of the
disease, the patient's prognosis, the burden of the treatment, and the .patient's statements and outlook on life. While engaging in this balancing process, the court should
have accorded the least weight to the patient's statements and the most weight to the
burden of the treatment. No court can make these decisions without adopting a uniform objective approach that protects all patients. See Barber v. Superior Ct., 147
Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (balance the benefits gained by treatment against burdens imposed); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421
A.2d 1334 (Del. Supr. Ct. 1980) (consider prognosis and magnitude of invasion); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417 (1977) (goal is to determine desire of patient); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d
408, 413 n.6 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989) (whether
treatment is oppressively burdensome to patient); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985) (before terminating treatment, the benefits from such termination should
clearly outweigh the burdens of sustaining it); In re Lydia E. Hall Hospital, 116 Misc.
2d 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (relying on patient's statements made
while competent).
92. For cases recognizing a constitutional right to privacy, see supra note 1.
93. The Supreme Court has not expressly defined the contours of the right to
privacy. See Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 244 (1977). See also Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1979); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670 (1973) [hereinafter Note, On
Privacy].
Although the use of phrases like "personal autonomy" and "dignity" have been
used to define the limits of the right to privacy, there is not yet any operative definition of privacy. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304 (2d ed. 1988).
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vacy only encompasses activities that relate to marriage, family or
procreation - the type of fundamental rights that are rooted in this
country's traditions."4 The other theory is that the right to privacy is
based on personal autonomy or the right of self-determination in
controlling inherently personal decisions." The personal autonomy
theory creates a more expansive view of the privacy right by allowing individuals greater freedom in making decisions that affect
society as a whole." In its most recent privacy decisions, the Supreme Court has rejected the personal autonomy theory as the basis
for the privacy right, relying instead on a determination that the
state had a sufficient, legitimate interest in the disputed legislation.97 However, the requirement that a legitimate governmental
purpose must underlie the legislation begs the question of what fac94. In reversing a lower court's finding that there is a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, the Court declined to expand the privacy right. Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). "The Court is most vulnerable . . . when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution." Id. One of the Court's considerations was
that proscriptions against sodomy have ancient roots. Id. at 192.
In Roe, the Court stated that there is not an unlimited right to do with one's
body as one pleases because that concept does not bear a close relationship to the
right of privacy as previously articulated in the Court's decisions. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154 (1973). See also Note, On Privacy, supra note 93, at 675-76.
95. In Bouvia v. Superior Court, the California appellate court found that a
competent, nonterminal patient had a constitutional right to refuse food and water.
179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (1986). Elizabeth Bouvia was a
twenty-eight year old quadriplegic who had suffered from cerebral palsy since birth.
Id. at 1135, Cal. Rptr. at 299. In determining that Ms. Bouvia had a right to refuse
nourishment, the court reasoned that a patient's right to consider the quality of their
life when making medical decisions was protected under the principle of self-determination. Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
"The constitutional right to privacy ... is an expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life." Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 737, 370 N.E.2d
417, 426 (1977). Joseph Saikewicz was a profoundly retarded sixty-seven year old
suffering from leukemia. Id. at 730, 370 N.E.2d at 420. Chemotherapy was the recommended treatment. Id. The court relied on the self-determination theory of the right
to privacy and allowed the guardian to refuse chemotherapy on Joseph's behalf. Id. at
745, 370 N.E.2d at 434.
Some courts have advanced the theory that a constitutional analysis is unnecessary because the common law provides a right of self-determination that encompasses
the right to refuse medical treatment. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (substituted judgment analysis abandoned in favor of exercising common law right); In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1982)(common law right controlling decision to disconnect respirator).
96. See generally Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View
of the Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304 (1977); Eichbaum, infra note 93, at 362.
97. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the Court specifically
based its decision on the fundamental right theory of privacy by finding that consensual homosexual activity could not be protected by the Constitution because this type
of activity is not grounded in the fundamental principles of the Constitution, and
that the Georgia legislature had the right to prohibit homosexual activity. Id. at 19294. See also supra note 95 (Court's interpretation of the privacy right).
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tors are needed to demonstrate a legitimate purpose."
In finding that the right to privacy is grounded in the principle
of personal autonomy, the Gray court examined cases recognizing a
federal right to control fundamental medical decisions.9 Because
the Gray court found that the central theme in those cases was to
protect an individual's dignity, it was logical to extend this same
reasoning to a patient in a persistent vegetative state. However,
since the Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Bowers v. Hardwick' 00 espoused a more restrictive view of the right to privacy, the
Gray court had to distinguish the cases on their facts. The Gray
court reasoned that because there was a common law right to control medical decisions,01 the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
must be deeply rooted in the traditions of this country and, therefore, is the fundamental type of activity that the Constitution was
02
designed to protect.1
Moreover, in an effort to further support its expansive view of
the right to privacy, the Gray court erroneously reasoned that because medical decisions were more similar to abortion, contraceptive
and surgical decisions, the holding in Bowers would not apply to the
right to terminate medical treatment. 03 However, after Bowers, it is
unlikely that the determination of Whether to starve an incompetent
patient would fall under the right to privacy "umbrella of rights."
Even though it is an intensely personal decision, that fact alone is
not enough to bring it within the protections of privacy.
The Gray court's reasoning is further eroded by the Supreme
Court's recent privacy decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, et. al.0 4 In that case, the Court determined that Missouri
abortion regulations did not violate a woman's right to privacy.'09
By doing so, the Court endorsed legislation that protects a compelling state interest.'06 The Court found that the state interest in protecting the life of a viable fetus is sufficiently compelling to restrict
98. L. TRIBE, supra note 93, at 1306-09.
99. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 585.
100. For a discussion of the Bowers decision, see supra notes 94 and 97.
101. For cases holding that the right to privacy is grounded in the common law,
see supra note 93.
102. Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 585-86.
103. Id. The contraception, abortion and surgical decisions upheld by the Court
as protected under the privacy right are extremely personal and the consequences of
such decisions may be life or death. Id. Therefore, the Court reasoned that because
refusing medical treatment that will certainly result in one's death is also a personal
decision with serious consequences, it is encompassed by the personal autonomy aspect of the right to privacy. Id.
104. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
105. Id. at 3056.
106. Id. at 3057.
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the availability of public funds for abortions. 1 7 The logical application of this conclusion to Gray is that even if withdrawal of nutrition was analyzed under a privacy framework, the state interest in
an adult person would be sufficiently compelling to require the patient to be fed. The Gray court has, in essence, created the type of
judge-made constitutional law specifically prohibited by the Court
08
in Bowers.
The recent Supreme Court decisions show a trend toward more
narrow interpretations of the right to privacy. 09 The issue is unresolved as to whether the right to refuse nutrition and hydration is
encompassed in this more limited view of the privacy right.1 However, the potential protection of this right must be analyzed under
the proper legal framework: whether the right to refuse nutrition
and hydration has "cognizable roots in the language or design of the
107.

Id.

108. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Courts should resist expanding
the substantive reach of the right of privacy, particularly if the result would redefine
the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Id. at 195. See also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (Court rejects most-expansive view of privacy that would
create unlimited right to control one's body).
The language limiting the privacy right in Roe is not an aberration. See Cruzan
v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 418, cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989). In fact, the
most recent Supreme Court case resisted expanding the privacy right beyond the
common theme of procreation and relationships within the marriage bonds. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). It seems, therefore, very doubtful that the privacy right encompasses decisions to terminate nourishment to a comatose patient.
109. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3057; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186. See also Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 771-72 (1986)
(statutes regulating abortions held invalid as violating right to privacy as it exists
within the limits specified by Roe); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
501-03 (1977) (Constitution protects sanctity of the family because the family is an
institution deeply rooted in history and tradition); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154
(1973) (upholding privacy right in order to seek some abortions); Comment, Suicidal
Competence, supra note 90, at 723.
110. A patient's refusal, by his or her guardian, of nutrition certainly will result
in death, but removal of a respirator may or may not result in death depending on
the patient's condition. In refusing to terminate blood transfusions, one court found
that the transfusions were analogous to food in that they would not cure the underlying disease, but the transfusions did eliminate the risk of death from another treatable cause. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.S.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (1981).
In a case very similar to Storar, another court denied the guardian's petition to
remove nutrition and hydration. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 413 n.6
(Mo. 1988)(en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989). The court specifically
noted that the patient is not terminally ill and that her death is imminent only if she
is denied food and water. Id. at 419. Furthermore, the court said it must tread carefully to protect those incompetent persons whose wishes would be to continue treatment. Id.
If a court accepts the idea that food and water are medical treatments that can
be refused, the next step, of course, would be to end life in a less painful way. Horan
& Grant, supra note 89, at 631-32; Comment, Suicidal Competence, supra note 90 at
735-43; Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasiafor the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 363 (1984) (arguing that the right of
privacy extends to individuals whose assistance is necessary to help competent terminal patients end their lives).
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Constitution." 1"
The trend in recent cases concerning the terminally ill or comatose patients is to protect their rights to refuse medical treatment
under the Constitutional privacy protections. 1 However, this issue
will not truly be resolved until it is addressed by the Supreme
Court.'
The right to privacy is only defined by the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the Constitution, and the current trend of
the Court is to restrict the parameters of this right.
Consequently, lower courts, like the district court which decided
Gray, should not expand the right to privacy beyond the Supreme
Court's restrictive view. The decision in Gray does exactly that.
Gray goes beyond the restrictive view because it is doubtful that the
right to terminate food and water would even be protected under
the right to privacy. Furthermore, even if it were classified under
the privacy umbrella, the Supreme Court's recent trend, especially
in light of Webster, suggests that the government's interest would
outweigh the individual's right to privacy as it applies to starvation
of a comatose patient.
Because of advancements in medical technology, this issue will
confront state courts with increasing regularity. State courts can
only evaluate these issues within the Supreme Court's decisions.
Therefore, it is imperative that the Supreme Court's future privacy
decisions more clearly define the parameters of the right to privacy.
Absent this type of guidance, this Constitutionally-based right will
be defined by the varying views of lower courts.
Donna L. Marks

111. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
112. Courts viewing nutrition and hydration as medical treatment have equated
artificial feeding with artificial respiration in that both procedures merely prolong the
moment of death. See generally Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129
A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass.
417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Corbett v. D'Alessantro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Ct. App.
1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct.
200, 464 N.E.2d 959, rev. denied, 392 Mass. 1101, 465 N.E.2d 261 (1984); Barber v.
Superior Ct., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). The patients involved
in those cases were in persistent vegetative states; there were no chances that they
would return to cognitive states. Therefore, food would not have cured them, but only
would have delayed their deaths.
113. The U.S. Supreme Court may soon address this issue because it granted
certiorari to review a similar case. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 N.W.2d 408, 413 n.6
(Mo. 1988)(en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).

